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Brooks: Human Ingenuity

HUMAN INGENUITY: A NOVEL
STANDARD FOR PATENTING
ALGORITHMS
I.

INTRODUCTION

As the Twentieth Century draws to a close, society continues to understand and assimilate a new and powerful technology: computers. Computer technology has already
revolutionized several industries and professions. l Now a
multibillion dollar industry, its rapid expansion continues
unabated. 2 Its ever increasing intrusion into everyday life
appears limitless, and commentators believe computer technology will usurp the present social structure. s
Fear of misappropriation has caused many developers of
computer technology to seek proprietary rights in their inventions. 4 Intellectual property law has long provided the
1. COMPETING VISIONS, COMPLEX REALITIES: SOCIAL AsPECTS OF THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY 33 (J. Schement & L. Lievrouw eds. 1987) ("The convergence oftelecommunications and computing technologies distribute information automation to the limits
of the world's communication networks."); see also Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The

Case against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program- Related
In.vention.s, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1115 (1990) (programs known as Expert System
Programs are presently used to make decisions in the fields of law, mathematics,
medical diagnoses, meteorology, investment analysis, agriculture, and chemistry).
2. United States based software sale was almost $29 billion in 1990: 20 percent above
its 1989 level. The Unites States Department of Commerce projects an increase in
sales of 20 percent in 1991 to almost $35 billion. See U.S. DEP'T OF CoMMERCE, U.S. INDuST'L .
OUTLOOK, COMPUTER EQUIPMENT AND SOFTWARE 28-15 (1991).
3. COMPETING VISIONS, COMPLEX REALITIES: SOCIAL AsPECTS OF THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY 116 (J. Schement & L. Lievrouw eds. 1987) ("The increased access and control of information that computer technology creates will interact with material
wealth to change the present social stratification.").
4. R. NIMMER, THE LAw OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY' 1.03 (1985) ("commercial value
coupled with relative ease of reproduction leads to substantial levels of unauthorized
copying and distribution" of software); see also S. MANDELL, COMPUTERS, DATA PROCESSING,
AND THE LAw, 160 (1984) ("Those with access to a system's program library can easily obtain
copies for their own use or, more frequently, for resale to a competitor. Technical security
measures ... are oflittle use ...."); J. VERGARI & V. SRUE, FuNDAMENTALS OF COMPUTER
HIGH-TECHNOLOGY LAw, §12.02 at 523-524 (1991) ("New [computer] technology and
attempts by manufacturers and vendors to protect it have resulted in numerous cases
involving the application of trade secret, patent, and copyright law ... to computer
products and programs."); Kidwell, Software and Semiconductors: Why Are We
Confused?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 533, 533 (1985) (explaining that both software and
semiconductors are expensive to develop but inexpensive to duplicate).
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necessary protection. However, a critical area of computer
technology, algorithms, remains unprotected. 6 Construing the
1952 Patent Act narrowly, the Supreme Court has adopted a
per se rule against patenting algorithms. Applying this restrictive standard of patentability, the Court has determined that
algorithms are like a law of nature and thus are not within the
categories of patentable subject matter listed in 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. 6
The Court seems to have stumbled in its approach to determine the patentability of algorithms by becoming trapped in
a categorical quagmire. Yet, in other areas of patent law, the
Court has developed standards to avoid categorical schemes.
Adopting a less restrictive standard of patentability, the Court
has developed a non-categorical approach to determine the
patentability of biotechnological inventions. Decisions concerning patents for living organisms provide the best example.
Determining that living organisms were the result of discovery and not invention, early patent law precluded them from
patent protection. Categorizing such organisms as products of
nature, the patent system adopted a per se rule against affording patent protection to these organisms regardless of the
amount of human intervention required to reduce them to a
useful product. 7 Modern biotechnology patent law now
5. See M. GEMIGNANI, COMPUTER LAw §39:7 (1985) (explaining that although it is
left unprotected, Mthe algorithm is often the most important aspect of the program and
that which its creator most wants to protect"); see also J. VERGARI & V. SHUE,
FUNDAMENTALS OF COMPUTER HIGH·TECHNOLOGY LAW, §l2.02 at 523 (1991) (by pre·
cluding Mideas, scientific discoveries, and mathematical formula" from patent pro·
tection, the Court has left algorithms unpatentable); Chisum, The Patentability Of
Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959, 960 (1986) (explaining that Mthe current state of
the law is that 'mathematical' algorithms 'as such' or 'in the abstract' do not consti·
tute patentable subject matter").
6. J. VERGARI & V. SHUE, FUNDAMENTALS OF COMPUTER HIGH·TECHNOLOGY LAw,
§12.02(b)(1)(D) at 540 (1991) (algorithms are one of Mseveral court created exceptions
to the statutory definition of patentable subject matter"); compare 35 U.S.C. § 101
(1991) (provides that M[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process
... may obtain a patent therefore"). The controversy centers around whether an algorithm is a patentable process under the 1952 Patent Act. See generally infra notes 2664 and accompanying text.
7. See Thorne, Relation of Patent Law to Natural Products, 6 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'v
23, 24-25 (1923) (MIt will be further seen from the decisions that plants and animal
organisms ... are not the proper subject matter for patent protection" because they
exist independent of human effort. (construing Wall v. Leck 66 F. 552 (9th Cir ..
1895»; see cilso Ex parte Latimer, 1889 DEC. COMM'R PAT. 123 (this is the seminal case
in which the patent office articulated its policy of precluding products of nature from
patent protection).
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recognizes that living organisms can constitute patentable
subject matter if they are "a product of human ingenuity."8
This Comment advocates that the Court afford patent protection to algorithms by adopting the standard of patentability applied in biotechnology patent law: human ingenuity.
Part II describes some fundamental aspects of computer technology. Part III discusses the current state of patent law concerning patenting algorithms. Part IV demonstrates that the
Court's restrictive standard of patentability is not consistent
with case precedent. Part V describes how the Court's policy of
precluding algorithms from patent protection subverts the
patent system. Part VI explicates a standard of patentability,
human ingenuity, and describes how this standard would
return predictability to the patent system.
II.

LOGICAL EQUIVALENCY

There are three distinct areas of computer technology:
hardware, software, and algorithms. Hardware consists of
physical devices: integrated circuits, video monitors, keyboards, and wired interconnectors.9 Software, often found on
punchcards, disks, magnetic tapes and various other media,10
is a sequence of instructions that directs the Central Processing
Unit (CPU) and other peripheral hardware in their respective
8. Diamond v. Chakrabarty 447 U.S. 303, 309,100 S.Ct. 2204, 2208, 206 U.S.P.Q.
193, 197 (1980); see Greenlee, Biotechnology Patent Law: Perspective of the First
Seventeen Years, Prospective on the Ne:d Seventeen Years, 68 DEN. U.L. REV. 127, 128
(1991) ("Courts, persuaded by evidence of the technical value added by the inventor's
activities, have held materials isolated and purified from nature patentable:).
9. M. GEMIGNANI, COMPUTER LAw § 2:1 (1985) ("[H]ardware is what makes a dent
in the floor when dropped .... Hardware does refer to the physical, the tangible, the
more concrete-the machine portions of a computer system. -); see also, J. VERGARI & V.
SHUE, FUNDAMENTALS OF COMPUTER-HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW, §l.Ol(c) at 6 (1991)
(describing hardware as "all of the tangible physical parts that make up a computer");
see United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922
(1979) (hardware is the "tangible machinery of the computer-).
10. A. TANNENBAUM, STRUCTURED COMPUTER ORGANIZATION 11 (2d ed. 1984).
There are several stages in the design of a program. At the programs inception, a programmer will create a block diagram or flow chart. This serves as an outline of.a specific series of steps that the program must perform to enable the computer to perform
its task. At a stage subsequent to this, the program will be converted into a language
that the computer can use, e.g., Basic, C, Pascal. Generally, it is these high level languages that are stored on magnetic media in the form of ones and zeros. See generally R. NIMMER, THE LAw OF COMPUTER TEcHNOLOGY' 1.03[2] (1985) (Nimmer explains
the general process behind creating a program).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992

3

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 10

458

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:455

functions. ll Definitions of an algorithm vary from that of a
"recipe, method, directions, and routine", 12 to a more formal definition, adopted by the Supreme Court, of "an unambiguous,
ordered sequence of steps that leads to the solution of a given
problem."13
Much of the confusion in computer related law results
from the similarity of hardware, software, and algorithms. 1.
"Any precisely defined algorithm ... may be realized in [both]
hardware," and software. 16 No definitive rule exists that mandates which functions are manifested in hardware and which
in software. Designers consider factors such as cost, speed, and
reliability when deciding which functions to fabricate in either
hardware or software. 16 For example on early computers the
ADD instruction was originally executed through the use of
hardware. 17 Present day programmable microcomputers (commonly known as PCs), perform this instruction through the use
of software. 18 In effect because hardware and software can both
express algorithms, they are logically equivalent.
11. J. TREMBLAY & R. BUNT, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER SCIENCE: AN
ALGORITHMIC ApPROACH 28 (1981); see also J. VERGARI & V. SHUE, FUNDAMENTALS OF
COMPUTER HIGH-TECHNOLOGY LAw, §1.02(c) at 7 (1991) (software is a "collection of computer instruction sets that tell the hardware what to do; each set is called a program").
There are generally two types of computer programs: application programs, and
operating system programs. Application programs are those that are designed to
accomplish a specific task, e.g., WordPerfect(word processor), Lotus 1-2-3(spread-sheet),
and Q-Modem(communications). Operating system programs enables the hardware
to work synergistically, e.g., MS-DOS, 4DOS, UNIX. See id. at § 12.02(c)(1)(B), at 554.
12. W. SAVITCH, TuRBO PASCAL 4.0/5.0 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ART AND SCIENCE
OF PROGRAMMING 8 (1989).
13. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186 n.9, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 1056 n.9, 209
U.S.P.Q. 1,8 n.9 (1981); J. TREMBLAY & R. BUNT, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER
SCIENCE: AN ALGORITHMIC APPROACH 35 (1981); see also Chisum, The Patentability of
Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959, 974-977 (1986) (for an in depth analysis of the definition of an algorithm).
14. See M. GEMIGNANI, COMPUTER LAw § 2:1 (1985); compare Davidson, Common
Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1037, 1040-1041 (1986) ("Software inundated the United States legal system with such force in such a short amount of time
that it is surprising the confusion is not more rampant. Software was first thought of
as patentable .•. then though of as not patentable: now it is considered as patentable
again.").
15. T. PRATT, PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES: DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION 19 (2d ed.
1983) ("Hardware and software lie on a continuum from the more concrete to the more
abstract."); see also M. GEMIGNANI, COMPUTER LAw § 40:1 (1985) ("[i]t is possible to build
a chip which contains precisely those circuits which define [a] program"); W. SAVITCH,
TuRBO PASCAL 4.0/5.0 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ~RT AND SCIENCE OF PROGRAMMING 8
(1989) (describing a program as an algorithm expressed in computer language).
16. A. TANNENBAUM, STRUCTURED COMPUTER ORGANIZATION 11 (2d ed. 1984).
17. [d. The ADD instruction is as it sounds. It adds binary numbers in the CPU.
See infra note 30 for an explanation of binary numbers.
18. A. TANNENBAUM, STRUCTURED COMPUTER ORGANIZATION 11 (2d ed. 1984).
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CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION VERSUS PATENT PROTECTION

The Constitution empowers Congress to provide for the protection of computer technology.19 By classifying computer programs as literary works, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) extends copyright
protection to the expression of the ideas contained in them. 20
Usually, hardware is not protected by copyright law because of
its utilitarian qualities. 21 Patent protection is generally the
appropriate means to protect proprietary interests in hardware.
Patenting algorithms would have distinct advantages over
copyrighting them. Unlike copyright law, patent law affords
an inventor a monopoly which increases the patent holder's
ability to license and market the technology.22 For an invention
to be amenable to patent protection, it must demonstrate
novelty, utility, and it must not be obvious. 23 This standard of
patentability was once thought to be a talisman: obviating
the problems encountered by the patent office when determining the patentability of an invention. 24 However, as this
19. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... B).
20. See, e.g., Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797
F.2d 1222, 1234, 230U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481, 488 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031
(1987) ("[Cjomputer programs are classified as literary works for the purposes of copyright. "); compare 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1991) (this statute describes the limitations on an
owner's exclusive rights in computer programs).
21. R. NIMMER, THE LAw OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY '11.02[3] (1985) ("Copyright
does not extend to utilitarian aspects of objects."); compare 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1991) (the
subject matter of copyright protection shall not include "mechanical or utilitarian
aspects"). Nimmer also explains that the utilitarian aspects of computer programs has
made copyright protection of them awkward. See R. NIMMER, THE LAw OF COMPUTER
TECHNOLOGY 'II 1.01 (1985).
22. 35 U.S.C. § 154 ("Every patent ... shall grant to the patentee ... for the term
of seventeen years ... the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
invention throughout the United States ...."); see L.J. KUTLEN, COMPUTER SOFTWARE
PROTECTIONILIABILITY/LAW/FORMS §3.02[5] (1988) (explaining that patent protection provides more clout in marketing an invention than copyright).
23. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1991) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new an!! useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvemerit thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title."); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1991) (describes in detail the situations
in which an invention will fail the novelty requirement); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1991) ("A patent
may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed ... if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art ... would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art ...."); see also Bailey, Progress as a Requirement to Patentability, 42 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 223 (1960) (this an excellent analysis of the requirements for patentability under
the 1952 Patent Act).
24. See infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
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Comment shall show, this standard of patentability has varied
depending upon the invention sought to be patented. 26
B.

CASE LAW CONCERNING COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY PATENTS

Patent cases involving algorithms have substantially confused the modern standard of patentability. Gottschalk v.
Benson was the first Supreme Court case to address the issue
of patenting algorithms. ls There were two claims of a patent
application in question: claims number 8 and 13. Claim number 8 described a method of storing binary coded signals in a
re-entrant shift register. 2? The application described claim
number 13 as a "data processing method for converting
binary coded decimal number representations into pure
binary. "28 Taken together, the Court found that the two claims
25. Gorenstein, The Dual Standard of Patentability: A New Look at the Computer
Issue, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 96 (1980) (arguing that the standard of patentability applied
is dependent upon the invention to be patented).
26. 409 U.S. 63, 93 S.Ct. 253, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (1972); see Chisum, The
Patentability ofAlgorithms, 47 U. Prrr. L. REV. 959, 972 (1986) (Chisum points out that
Benson is the 'sole source of the aparrent rule against patenting algorithms').
27. Claim 8 reads:
The method of converting signals from binary coded deciJ:nal form into binary
which comprises the steps of
(1) storing the binary coded decimal signals in are-entrant
shift register,
(2) shifting the signals to the right by at least three places,
until there is a binary 1 in the second position of said register,
(3) masking out said binary 1 in said second position of
said register,
(4) adding a binary 1 to the first position of said register,
(5) shifting the signals to the left by two positions,
(6) adding a 1 to said first position, and
(7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions
in preparation for a succeeding binary 1 in the second position of said register.
409 U.S. at 73-74, 93 S. Ct. at 258, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 677.
28. Claim 13 reads:
A data processing method for converting binary coded
decimal number representations into binary number representations comprising the steps of
(1) testing each binary digit position 'I', beginning with the
least significant binary digit position, of the most significant
decimal digit representation for a binary 0 or a binary '1';
(2) if a binary '0' is detected, repeating step (1) for the
next least significant binary digit position of said most significant decimal digit representation;
(3) if a binary '1' is detected, adding a binary 'I' at the
(i+1)th and (i+3) least significant binary digit positions of the
next lesser significant decimal digit representation, and
repeating step (1) for the next least significant binary digit
position of said most significant decimal digit representation;
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recited an algorithm for converting binary coded decimal numbers (BCD) into pure binary numbers.29 A binary coded decimal (BCD) is an intermediate step between decimal numerals
and binary numerals. 30
In his opinion, Justice Douglas considered whether the
algorithm was a patentable process within the meaning of the
1952 Act, but he never answered this inquiry.31 Refusing to determine whether the invention claimed demonstrated novelty, utility, and nonobviousness, he found that the patentability of the
(4) upon exhausting the binary digit positions of said
most significant decimal digit representation, repeating
steps (1) through (3) for the next lesser significant decimal
digit representation as modified by the previous execution
of steps (1) through (3); and
(5) repeating steps (1) through (4) until the second least
significant decimal digit representation has been so processed.
409 U.S. at 74,93 S. Ct. at 258-259, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 677.
29. Id. at 65, 93 S. Ct. at 254,175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 674.
30. The Court explained binary numbers as follows:
The pure binary system of positional notation uses two symbols as digits 0 and 1, placed in a numerical sequence with
values based on consecutively ascending powers of 2. In
pure binary notation, what would be the tens position is
the twos position; what would be hundreds position is the·
fours position; what would be the thousands position is the
eights. Any decimal number from 0 to 10 can be represented
in the binary system with four digits or positions as indicated
in the following table.
Shown as the sum of powers of2
2"
2"
2'
2°
Pure
Decimal (8)
(4)
(2)
(1)
Binary
0 = 0 +0 + 0 +0 =0000
1 = 0 + 0 + 0 + 2° = 0001
2 = 0 + 0 + 2' + 0 = 0010
3 = 0 + 0 + 2' + 2° = OOll
4 = 0 + 2" + 0 + 0 = 0100
5 = 0 + 2" + 0 + 2° = 0101
6 = 0 + 2" + 2' + 0 = OllO
7 = 0 + 2" + 2' + 2° = 01ll
8 = 2" + 0 + 0 + 0 = 1000
9 = 2" + 0 + 2° + 0 = 1001
10 = 2" + 0 + 2' + 0 = 1010
The BCD System using decimal numerals replaces the character for each component decimal digit in the decimal numeral with the corresponding four-digit binary numeral, shown in
the right-hand column of the table. Thus decimal 53 is represented as 0101 OOll in BCD, because decimal 5 is equal to
binary 0101 and decimal 3 is equivalent to binary 0011. In pure
binary notation, however, decimal 53 equals binary ll0101.
Id. at 66-67, 93 S. Ct. at 255,175 U.S.P.Q. at 674-675.
31. Id. at 64, 93 S. Ct. at 254,175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 674; compare 35 U.S.C.
§100(b) (1991) (defining a process as a "process, art, or method-).
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invention was better left to Congress for resolution because
the Court was not adequately equipped to render an opinion. 32
In support of his deference to Congress, Justice Douglas found
that the claim was unpatentable. Although his holding was convoluted, the author contends that Justice Douglas determined
the claim reciting the algorithm was not amenable to patent protection because it failed to satisfy the requirements of section
112.33 However, subsequent~ecisions have failed to demonstrate a consistent interpretation of the Benson holding.

Parker v. Flook,s· was the second case in which the Court
addressed the patentability of a claim that recited an algorithm. 36 The patent at issue was for a process of updating
alarm limits on a catalytic conversion ofhydrocarbons. 36 The
process contained three steps: measuring the value of the process temperature; calculating the updated alarm-limit value
through use of an algorithm; and adjusting the alarm limit to
the updated value. 37
In his opinion, Justice Stevens interpreted Benson as
holding that algorithms are not patentable per se. 38 In support of this per se rule, Justice Stevens articulated the rationale that all algorithms were within the prior art, i.e., not
32. See id. at 71-72, 93 S. Ct. at 258,175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 677.
33. See infra notes 102-114 and accompanying text.
34. 437 U.S. 584, 98 S.Ct. 2522, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1978).
35. ld. at 586, 98 S. Ct. at 2523, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 195.
36.ld.
37. "Claim 1 of the patent describes the method as follows:
'1. A method for updating the value of at least one alarm limit
on at least one process variable involved in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons
wherein said alarm limit has a current value of
Bo+K
'wherein Bo is the current alarm base and K is a predetermined alarm offset which comprises:
'(I) Determining the present value of said process variable,
said present value being defined as PVL;
'(2) Determining a new alarm base Bl, using the following
equation:
Bl = Bo(1.0-F) + PVL(F)
'where F is a predetermined number greater than zero and
less than 1.0;
'(3) Determining an updated alarm limit which is defined as
B 1 + K; and thereafter
'(4) Adjusting said alarm limit to said updated alarm limit
value.ld. at 596-597, 98 S. Ct. at 2529,198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 200.
38. ld. at 585, 98 S. Ct. at 2523, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 195.
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new. 39 Finding that the algorithm was the only element of the
invention not used before in other catalytic conversions, he held
the claim not proper for patent protection because it lacked novelty.40 He went further and adopted a very hostile view toward
patenting algorithms by declaring that Congress must act
affirmatively before these types of inventions become amenable
to patent protection. 41
The confusion concerning what standard of patentability to
apply to computer technology patents began to manifest itself
in the lower courts following the Flook decision. 42 With little
guidance from the Supreme Court, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals developed a two-part test, the Freeman test, to
determine if a claim, reciting an algorithm, was amenable to
patent protection. 43 Under this test, a court must first determine whether a claim recites an algorithm as defined in
Benson. 44 If such an algorithm is present, the next step is to
determine if the claim "wholly preempted" the algorithm, and
if it does, the claim is invalid.'6 Apparently, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals ignored the finding in Flook that
all algorithms were part of prior art.
39. Id. at 594,98 S. Ct. at 2527-2528,198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 199. This approach
is often called the "point ofnoveltyB. For an analysis of this approach, see Comment,
62 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 521 (1980). The reader should note that the Court rejected this
test for determining patentability in Diamond v. Diehr. See,infra note 59 and accompanying text.
'
40. Id. at 594,98 S. Ct. at 2527-2528, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 199.
41. Id. at 596, 98 S. Ct. at 2528, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 200 ("We would require
a clear and certain signal from Congress before approving the position of a litigant who,
as respondent here, argues that the beachhead of privilege is wider, and the area of
public use narrower, than courts had previously thought.B (quoting Deepsouth Packing
Co. v Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531, 92 S.Ct. 1700, 1708, 173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 769,
774))).
42. Gorenstein, The Dual Standard of Patentability: A New Look at the Computer
Issue, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 106-107 (1980) ("The inconsistency between PTO practice
and the standards set forth in Flook indicates ... too restrictive a standard ... applied
to innovations involving an algorithm. B).
43. In re Freeman 573 F.2d 1237, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 464 (C.C.P.A. 1978); see
also Goldberg, Patent Protection for Computer Processes and Computer Devices, C567
A.L.I.-AB.A. 139 (1990) (speaking on behalf of the Patent Trademark Office). The Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals, was the only appellate court that reviewed decisions
of patent examiners. Now the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals currently performs
the duties of those of the now abolished Court of Customs arid Patent Appeals. See E.
KITCH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 771-772 (4th ed.
1989).
44. 573 F.2d at 1245, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 471. This prong of the test was probably a response by the C.C.P.A. to the dictum in Benson that explained how the
claim in that case, if found patentable, would preempt the algorithm. See infra note
109 and accompanying text.
45. Id. at 1245, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 471.
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The lower courts' disregard of the Flook decision continued
in the decision of In re Walter.48 Here, the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals modified the second prong of the Freeman
test. Abolishing the focus on preemption, the court of Customs
and Patent Appeals articulated a standard of patentability for
process patents radically different from that espoused in either
Benson or Flook. The court here required that the invention,
of which an algorithm is part, must be tangible in order for the
claim to be the proper subject of a patent. 4?
Subsequent to the Walter decision, the Supreme Court
rendered its most recent decision concerning the patenting of
algorithms in Diamond v. Diehr. 48 Relying on Benson, Justice
Rehnquist expressly held that algorithms were not the proper subject for patent protection because they were like a law
of nature. 49 Justice Rehnquist specifically rejected the reasoning in Flook that algorithms were not patentable because
they were not new. 60 He asserted that "[t]he novelty of any element or steps in a process ... is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101
categories of possibly patentable subject matter. "51
The claimed invention at issue in Diehr was a process for
molding raw uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision
products. 52 Many steps in this process used an algorithm, the
Arrhenius equation, to calculate the correct time to open the
press. 53 The Court here distinguished this case from Benson
46. 618 F.2d 758,205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 397 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
47. Id. at 767, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 406 (a claim containing a mathematical algorithm would be patentable if the algorithm specifically dermed structural relationships
between physical elements of an apparatus claim, or limited claim steps in a process
claim).
48. 450 U.S. 175, 101 S.Ct. 1048,209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1981).
49. Id. at 186, 101 S.Ct. at 1056, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 8 (1981) ("We defined an
'algorithm' as a 'procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem,' and we
concluded that such an algorithm, or mathematical formula, is like a law of nature,
which cannot be the subject of a patent. ").
50. Id. at 188-189, 101 S. Ct. at 1058, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 9.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 177 n.1, 101 S. Ct. at 1052 n.1, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 4 n.1 ("[AJ'cure'
is obtained by mixing curing agents into the uncured polymer in advance of molding
and then applying heat over a period of time. If the synthetic rubber is cured for the
right length of time at the right temperature, it becomes a usable product. ").
53. The language of the court is as follows:
The equation is named after its discoverer Svante Arrhenius
and has long been used to calculate the cure time in rubbermolding presses. The equation can be expressed as follows:
In v ... CZ + x
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and Flook by finding that the invention here was applied to a process. In his decision, Rehnquist stated that the patent was valid
even though its claims recited an algorithm because the algorithm
applied to a "process which ... [was] performing a function the
patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing) .... "64 However,
Rehnquist failed to articulate a standard by which the lower
courts could determine whether an algorithm was applied in a
process so that it would be amenable to patent protection.
Shortly following the Diehr decision, the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, in the decision of In re Abele, again modified the secorid prong of the Freeman test. 66 The Abele decision
permitted examining claims without the algorithm to determine
if what remained was statutory subject matter.68 If what
remained was statutory subject matter, the claim reciting the
algorithm would be patentable only if the algorithm applied to
a process step.67 Applying this analysis, an examiner or court
would entirely omit an algorithm from consideration when
determining whether a claim was patentable. The court, in
Abele, found the claim at issue patentable because "absent
the algorithm, the steps present would result in a conventional CAT-scan process. "68 The algorithm was not used
merely to solve a mathematical equation, rather it was incorporated into a larger process to produce an improved Cat-scan.69
wherein In v is the natural logarithm of v, the total required
cure time; C is the activation constant, a unique figure for each
batch of each compound being molded, determined in accordance with rheometer measurements of each batch; Z is the
temperature in the mold; and x is a constant dependent on the
geometry of the particular mold in the press. A rheometer is
an instrument to measure flow of viscous substances.
[d. at 177-178 n.2, 101 S. Ct. at 1058 n.2, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 4 n.2.
54. See id. at 192, 101 S. Ct. at 1059-1060, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 10. This statement can be interpreted as an implicit adoption, by the Supreme Court, of the physicality requirement espoused in Walter.
55. 684 F.2d 902, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 682 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
56. [d. at 907,214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 686.
57. [d.
58. [d. at 908, 214 U.$.P.Q. (BNA) at 687 (the algorithm was used merely to obtain
a higher resolution CAT-scan thereby making images of internal organs and bones easier to recognize).
59. The language of the court was as follows:
The algorithm ... is merely applied to the Mattenuation
data W to eliminate what would otherwise appear as artifacts ... What appellants have done is to discover an application of an algorithm to process steps which are themselves
part of an overall process which is statutory. Hence, [the
algorithm] cannot be construed as a mere procedure for
solving a given mathematical problem.
[d. at 908-909, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 688.
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In re Grams provides the most recent ruling, from the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals (formerly the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals), on a process claim reciting an
algorithm. eo This decision left in a state of confusion, the test
for determining whether a claim containing an algorithm is
patentable. The process involved gathering data from a patient
and using a computer algorithm to compare the gathered data
with other pre-determined parameters and thereby determining if a patient's condition was abnorma1. 61 The court found
that the test articulated in Walter was no longer determinative
for ascertaining whether a claim reciting an algorithm is
patentable. 62 Finding the claim unpatentable, the court opted
for an ad hoc determination as to whether a claim reciting an
algorithm was patentable. 63
The ad hoc standard of patentability applied by the lower
courts in recent patent cases, is a result of the Supreme Court's
departure, in Diehr, from the long established principal that
the novelty and utility of an invention is the touchstone for
determining its patentability. In adopting its approach of categorically precluding algorithms from patent protection,64 the
Court in Diehr usurped 200 years of case precedent. Further,
it has left in a state of confusion the proper standard of patenability a court must apply.
IV.
A.

CONFLICTS WITH TRADITIONAL PATENT LAW
EARLY PATENT LAW

Although Diehr asserted that novelty is irrelevant when
determining patentable subject matter, an examination of the
60. 888 F.2d 835,12 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d 1824 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
61. Id. at 836, 12 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d at 1825.
62. "[F]ailure to meet ... [the Walter] test does not necessarily doom the claim."
Id. at 839, 12 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d at 1827. "The presence of a physical step in the claim
to derive data for the algorithm will not render the claim statutory." Id. at 840, 12
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d at 1828.
63. Id. at 841, 12 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d at 1829. The court never clearly articulated its test for determining whether a claim containing a mathematical algorithm was
patentable. see Note, The Return Of The Walter Test: Patentability Of Claims
Containing Mathematical Algorithms After In re Grams, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 962 (1991)
("After Grams, courts are left to make their own subjective determinations of what the
applicants invented. ").
64. See Chisum, The Patentability Of Algorithms, 47 U. PI'M'. L. REV. 959, 960
(1986) (explaining "the current state of the law is that 'mathematical' algorithms 'as such'
or 'in the abstract' do not constitute patentable subject matter"); see also Samuelson,
Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer
Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1095 (1990) ("[Without] emphasis ...
placed on the industrial nature of Diehr's process it would not have been patentable.").
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Patent System's history shows that this is incorrect. In 1790,
Congress passed the first Patent Act (1790 Act).66 The 1790 Act
established a permissive standard of patentability. To be
amenable to patent protection, the Act stressed that an invention demonstrate novelty and utility.66 However, almost immediately after the 1790 Act became law, the patent examiners
established subsidiary requirements to further refine the standard. 67 Applying these requirements, the examiners precluded from patent protection inventions made in the
following manner: a new use of an old invention, a new form or
proportion of an old invention, an old invention made with a
new material. 66 At a later time the examiners found it neces65. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1850), repealed by Act of Feb. 21, 1793
. ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1850).
66. [d.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
upon the petition of any person or persons to the Secretary of
State, the Secretary for the department of war. and the
Attorney-General of the United States, setting forth that he,
she, or they hath or have invented or discovered any useful art,
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known or used, and praying that a
patent may be granted therefor, it shall and may be lawful to
and for the said Secretary of state, the Secretary for the
department of war. and the Attorney-General, or any two of
them, if they shall deem the invention of discovery sufficient·
ly useful and important, to cause Letters of Patent to be made
out in the name of the United States .... (emphasis added).
67. This is probably attributable to the lack of guidance from the framers of the
Constitution in elucidating exactly what types of inventions they intended to protect.
See Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y,
5,17 (1966) (noting that shortly after the Committee of Detail's submission of the intellectual property clause, on 5 September 1787, the Constitutional Convention adopted it without debate).
68. The Department of State administered the 1790 Act. Under that Act, the
Secretary of State, Secretary for the Department of War, and the AttorneyGeneral
reviewed all patent applications. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109-110 (1850),
repealed by Act of Feb. 21, 1793 ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1850). It was Thomas Jefferson
in his capacity a Secretary of State who was the motivation behind implementing the
subsidiary requirements. See Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability,
48 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y, 5, 26 (1966) ("The first 'board' [of patent examiners] comprised
Thomas Jefferson, Henry Knox and Edmund Randolph, with Jefferson being the primary movant of the group.").
Jefferson wrote:
[T]hat a machine of which we were possessed, might be
applied by every man to any use of which it is susceptible, and
that this right ought not to be taken from him and given to
a monopolist, because the first perhaps had occasion so to
apply it. Thus a screw for crushing plaster might be
employed for crushing corn- cobs. And a chain-pump for
raising water might be used for raising wheat: this being
merely a change of application. Another rule was that a change
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sary to preclude a combination of known elements from patent
protection. 69 The task of examining patents quickly became overly burdensome for the examiners.70 With the passing of the Patent
Act of 1793 (1793 Act), Congress abolished the examination.
The 1793 Act further lowered the standard of patentability making patent protection more permissive than it was
under the 1790 Act. It decreased the 1790 Act's utility requirement by abolishing the criteria that an invention be "sufficiently useful and important."71 The act also codified the
of material should not give title to a patent: As the making
ofa ploughshare of cast rather than of wrought iron; a comb
of iron instead of horn or of ivory, or the connecting buckets
by a band ofleather rather than of hemp or iron. A third was
that a mere change of form should give no right to a patent,
as a high-quartered shoe instead of a low one: a round hat
instead of a three-square: or a bucket instead of a round one.
But for this rule, all the changes of fashion in dress would
have been under the tax of patentees.
Burchfiel, Revising the ·Original" Patent Clause, 2 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 155, 182-183
(1989) (quoting Thomas Jefferson's letter of Aug. 13, 1813 to Isaac McPherson in VI
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 181-82 (Washington ed. 1814».
69. Jefferson wrote:
[Ilf we have a right to use three things separately, I see
nothing in reason, or in the patent law, which forbids our
using them all together. A man has a right to use a saw, an
axe, a plane separately: may he not combine their uses on the
same piece of wood?
Burchfiel, Revising the ·Original" Patent Clause, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 155, 183
(1989) (quoting Thomas Jefferson's letter of Jan. 16, 1814 to Oliver Evans in VI
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 298 (Washington ed. 1814».
70. Burchfiel, Revising the ·Original" Patent Clause, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH.155,
184 n.170 (1989) ("Jefferson indicated that because of an 'abundance' of applications
and the requirement of examination, which required 'more time of the members of the
board than they could spare from higher duties, the whole was turned over to the judiciary, to be matured into a system, under which every one might know when his actions
were safe and lawful." (quoting a letter to Isaac McPherson Aug. 13, 1813 in VI
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 181-182 (Washington ed. 1814».
71. Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, § I, 1 Stat. 318-321, repealed by Act of July
4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1853)
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, that
when any person or persons, being a citizen or citizens of the
United States, shall allege that he or they have invented any
new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art,
machine, manufacture, or composition or matter, not known
or used before the application, and shall present a petition
to the Secretary of State, signifying a desire of obtaining an
exclusive property in the same, and praying that a patent
may be granted therefore, it shall be made lawful for the said
Secretary of State, to cause Letters of Patent to be made out
... (emphasis added).
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subsidiary requirement applied by the patent examiners under
the 1790 Act that a patent would not issue for "simply changing the form or the proportions of any machine, or composition
of matter. "72 Without the examination process, Congress left
to the courts the task of determining what inventions were
patentable. From the court decisions that followed,
Commentators have found that the courts' principal inquiry for
determining patentable subject matter was novelty.7s
The courts interpreted the subsidiary requirements, applied
by the patent examiners under the 1790 act, as a further
refinement of the definintion of novelty.74 From the application
of these subsidiary requirements, the Courts developed the
Substantial Novelty test. 76 Applying this test, the courts focused
on the invention, and not the process that brought about its creation, to determine if novelty was present. 76 Under the
72. [d. § 2. The statute read as follows:
[T]hat any person who shall have discovered an improvement
in the principle of any machine, or in the process of any composition of matter, which shall have obtained a patent for such
improvement, he shall not be at liberty to use the improvement;
And it is hereby enacted and declared, that simply changing the
form or their proportions of any machine or composition of
matter, in any degree, shall not be deemed a discovery.
73. See T. FESSENDEN, AN ESSAY ON THE LAw OF PATENTS FOR NEW INVENTIONS, 5960 (2nd ed. 1822) (describing that novelty was a mitigating factor for determining
whether an invention was patentable subject matter and that utility required only that
an invention not be "frivolous and mischievous [sic]"); G. CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS §§ 16-17, at 15 (1st ed. 1849); see also
Burchfiel, Revising the ·Original" Patent Clause, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 155, 188
(l989) ("Novelty is the proper first inquiry of the court in weighing patent validity.
· .. " (construing Earle v. Sawyer 8 F.Cas. 254 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No. 4,247); see, e.g.,
Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F.Cas. 37,37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1,217) ("The law, however,
does not look to the degree of utility; it simply requires, that it shall be capable of use,
and that the use is such as sound morals and policy do not discountenance or prohibit.").
74. G. CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 18,
at 16 (lst ed. 1849) ("Our courts have, in truth, without using the same terms,
applied [the subsidiary requirements when] determining whether alleged inventions
· .. possess the necessary element of novel ty .").
75. See T. FESSENDEN, AN ESSAY ON THE LAw OF PATENTS FOR NEW INVENTIONS, 147
(2nd ed. 1822) ("with regard to what constitutes the identity, or diversity of two machines
· .. the material question, therefore, is ... whether the given effect is produced substantially by the same mode of operation and the same combination of powers on both
machines"); Burchfiel, Revising the "Original" Patent Clause, 2 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 155,
195 (l989). See supra note 28 and accompanying text for the requirements that formed
the basis for courts constructing the Substantial Novelty test.
76. G. CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS §§ 1617, at 15 (lst ed. 1849 (explaining that it is the character and purposes of the invention that a court must examine to determine novelty and not the ingenuity of the
inventor who created it); see Burchfiel, Revising the ·Original" Patent Clause, 2
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 155, 191 (1989) ("U]n the case ora machine, the proper inquiry is
whether it has been 'substantially constructed before' and in the case of an improvement, 'whether that improvement has ever been applied to such a machine before, or
whether it is substantially a new combination.")
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Substantial Novelty test, a device would fail as patentable
subject matter if it performed SUbstantially the same function
in substantially the same way to obtain substantially the
same result as any invention in prior art.77 In effect, the
courts required nothing more than an invention be new and
useful to be subject to patent protection. Although the court
managed to further refine the standard for patentability with
the Substantial Novelty test, eradication of the patent examination made the 1793 Act ineffective. 78 Congress repealed it
with the Patent Act of 1836 (1836 Act).
The 1836 Act demonstrated the Patent Systems adherence
to a relatively permissive standard of patentability.79 It maintained the requirements for patentability that an invention
need nothing more than to be new and useful, but it omitted the
provision in the 1793 Act relating to change of form or proportion. 80 The belief being that this provision was redundant
because it, as well as the other subsidiary requirements, applied
by the patent examiners under the 179q Act, was subsumed within the Substantial Novelty test. 81 Thus, under the 1836 Act, an
invention need demonstrate no more than novelty and utility to
be amenable to patent protection. 82 All the patent acts subsequent to the 1836 Act, with the exception of the 1952 Act, preserved the standard of patentability espoused in the 1836 Act. 8s
77. See id. at 192.
78. See Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC'v, 5, 28 (1966) ("Duplications, frauds and frivolous patents were a problem. That
Act also failed to provide the incentive to industry and economic growth .... ").
79. This Act also established the Patent Office, and reinstituted the examination
process for patents. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, revised by Act of July 8,
1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1871).
80. See Burchfiel, Revising the ·Original- Patent Cl~use, 2 HARv. J.L. & TECH.
155, 197 (1989) ("The provision relating to change of form or proportion was eliminated
in the 1836 act ....").
81. See G. CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS §§
2-4, at 3-4 (1st ed. 1849); see also Burchfiel, Revising the "Original" Patent Clause, 2l1ARv.
J.L. & TECH. 155, 196-202 (1989) ("[E]vidently [these subsidiary requirements were considered] as surplusage and without affecting the patentability standard, since the
judiciary continued to apply it as implicit in the [S]ubstantial [N]ovelty requirement:).
82. See Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF.
SOc'v, 5, 31 (1966) ("[P]rior to 1850, the question of whether or not an invention was
patentable was determined by the answer as to whether it was novel."). Some commentators believed it necessary to abolish the provision in the 1793 Act that precluded granting patents to inventions that were merely a change of form and proportion. They
believed that no precedent existed in patent law that substantiated any requirements
for patent protection beyond that of novelty and utility. See G. CURTIS, A TREATISE ON
THE LAw OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 16, at 15 n.1 (1st ed. 1849).
83. See Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF.
SOc'v, 5, 30 (1966) (All statutes subsequent to the 1836 Act "preserved the essential
requirements of'new and useful' ... until 1952 [when] Congress express[ed] a statutory
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN STANDARD OF PATENTABILITY

Although the patent statutes maintained a standard of
patentability that required a patentable invention to demonstrate no more than novelty and utility, in the years before passage of the 1952 Act, the Court developed a more restrictive
standard of patentability. Justice Nelson first articulated this
standard for the Supreme Court in the 1850 Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood opinion.84 This standard became known as invention.86
In Hotchkiss, the Court heard an appeal based on an objection to a trial judge's jury instruction that required the jury to
determine a patent's validity based on ingenuity and not
Substantial Novelty.86 The patent at issue was for the manufacture of knobs made from different types of clay and porcelain. 87 Justice Nelson determined that" the only thing new [in
the knob's manufacture] is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with
this arrangement. "88 He found that the trial judge's jury
instruction was proper and refused to apply the Substantial
Novelty test to determine the patentability of the claim. In his
holding, Justice Nelson articulated that the degree of skill
and ingenuity possessed by an ordinary mechanic was the
proper threshold standard of patentability.89 This decision
public policy of a standard for patentability."); see also Kitch, John Deere Co.: New
Standard for Patents, 49 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y, 237, 242 (1967) (describing that the proper inquiry for determining patentability under the pre 1952 patent acts were novelty and utility).
84. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
85. A. WALKER, TEXT-BooK OF THE PATENT LAws OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
§ 23 (1885). In his book, Walker speaks ofthis test as a separate requirement independent of the novelty and utility standards. Contemporary commentators continue
to debate this topic. The author contends that this standard is not separate from novelty and utility, but is a furhter refinement of novelty. See infra note 100.
86. 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 264. The trial jude instructed the jury as follows:
[If] the knob of clay was simply the substitution of one
material for another, the spindle and shank being the same
as before in common use, and also the mode of connecting
then by dovetail to the knob the same as before in common
use, and no more ingenuity or skill required to construct the
knob in this way that that possessed by an ordinary mechanic
acquainted with the business, the patent was invalid, and the
plaintiffs were not entitled to a verdict.
87. 1d. at 264-265.
88. 1d. at 265.
89. See id. at 267. The heart of the majority's reasoning came from the following:
Now if the foregoing view of the improvement claimed in this
patent be correct ... unless [there were] more ingenuity and
skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and
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was not without its critics. 90 Because Hotchkiss usurped established patent law, it would be sixteen years before the courts
would accept the test ofinvention. 91
Although the invention test enunciated in Hotchkiss was
constitutionally dubious,92 the Court found the standard to
be of such importance that it articulated a constitutional
justification for it by the late 19th century.93 However, a struggle ensued to establish a standard of patentability that included the invention requirement. '" It was not until 1966 with the
the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or
porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of
that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential
elements of every invention (emphasis added).
90. The dissenting justice construing several cases, English and American that refuted the majority's reasoning, clearly articulates the usurpation,in patent law, caused by
this decision. , "[i]t is thus apparent to my mind that the test adopted below for the purpose to which it was applied, and which has just been sanctioned here, has not the countenance of precedent, either English or American; and, at the same time, it seems open
to great looseness or uncertainty in practice.- 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 270. See Burchfiel,
Revising the ·Original- Patent Clause, 2 lIARv. J.L. & TECH. 159 (1989) (the entire discussion of this article challenges the Court's adoption of this standard); Seidel, The
Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF. Soo'y, 5 (1966).
91. See Burchfiel, 2 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 155,208 n.301 (1989) ("The first postHotchkiss Supreme Court case to suggest that a patent was invalid on the basis that
the difference between the invention and the prior art 'required no invention' and
involved simply mechanical skill, which is not patentable.- (describing Simpson v.
Woodman 77 U.S.(10 Wall.) 117 (1869))).
92. See id. at 167 (explaining that the Continental Congress specifically rejected Jefferson's proposal for higher levels of patentability beyond novelty and utility).
93. See, e.g., Hollisterv. Benedict Mfg., 113 U.S. 59, 73, 5 S.Ct. 717, 724 (1885)
(the machine "is but a display of the expected skill of the calling, and ... is in no sense
the creative work of that ... which it is the purpose of the Constitution and the patent
laws to encourage and reward-); Thompson v. Boisselier, 114 U.S. 1, 11, 5 S.Ct. 1042,
1047 (1884) ("[i]t is not enough that a thing shall be new ... and useful, but it must,
under the Constitution and the statute, amount to an invention-).
94. See, e.g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Co., 340
U.S. 147, 154, 71 S.Ct. 127, 131, (1950), reh'g denied 340 U.S. 918 (1951) (in their concurrence, both Justice Douglas and Black opined that only patentable inventions were
those which "serve the ends of science-to push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics,
and the like ... [whereby] masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize
it as an advance-); Goodyear Tire & Rubber v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 279, 64 S.Ct.
593,594 (1944) (the Court found a patent invalid because the invention was "simple and
such as should have been obvious to those who worked in the field .... -); Exhibit Supply
Co., v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 138, 62 S.Ct. 513, 519 (1941) (in their dissent,
both Justice Black and Douglas asserted that the standard of invention is subjectively determined by the individual justice's views "[t]o call the device here an invention or
discovery such as was contemplated by the Constitution or the statute is, in my judgment, to degrade the meaning of those terms-); .cuno Engineering Corp. v. Atlantic
Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91, 62 S.Ct. 37,41 (1941) (the Court, believing that an invention ·must reveal [a] flash of creative genius and not merely the skill- expected of a
mechanic in the art, found a patent for a cigarette lighter invalid); see also Burchfiel,
Revising the ·OriginaZ- Patent Clause, 2lIARv. J.L. & TECH. 159, 168 (1989) ([Before 1950]
"the constitutional theory proposed ... was not expounded clearly.-).
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decision of Graham v. John Deere CO.96 that the Court clearly
established a standard of patentability that incorporated the
invention requirement. 96
Construing, for the first time, the new requirement
espoused in section 103, of the 1952 Patent Act (1952 Act),B7 the
Court, in Graham, determined that it "codif[ied] the ... principle [asserted in] Hotchkiss v. Greenwood."98 Also, the Court
expressly rejected arguments that the 1952 Act changed the
standard ofpatentability.99 While the Court treated section 103
as a separate and distinct requirement, many commentators
have found that section 103 was simply a further refinement
of what constituted novelty under the Act. loo Thus, it is clear
from both the legislative history of the 1952 Act and the
Graham decision that an invention's patentability was never
to be determined by the restrictive standard now applied by the
95. 383 U.S. 1,86 S.Ct. 684, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459 (1966).
96. See Kitch, Graham II. John Deere Co.: New Standard for Patents, 49 J. PAT.
OFF. SOc'y 237,299 (1967) (describing that the standard of patentability set fort by
Deere under the 1952 Act Mpoints in the direction of ... returning patent law to the
relative simplicity of the statute").
97. 35 U.S.C. § 103
Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described ... if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the
manner in which the invention was made.
98. 383 U.S. at 17,86 S. Ct. at 693,148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 466. The Court also
defined a three-step factual determination for the obviousness of an invention. -Under
§ 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between
the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary
skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or
nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined." Id. at 17, 86 S. Ct. at 694, 148
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 466.
99. 383 U.S. 1, 17, 86 S.Ct. 684,693, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 466 (1966» (MWe
believe that this legislative history, as well as other sources, shows that the revision
was not intended by Congress to change the general level of patentable invention.")
(emphasis added).
100. FEDERICO, COMMENTARY ON THE NEW PATENT ACT, 35 U.S.C.A. § 1,3 (1954) (MIn
form [section 103] is a limitation on section 102 and it should more logically have been
made part of section 102, but it was made a separate section to prevent 102 from becoming too long and involved and because of its importance. "). Federico further stated, M[i]t
has been recognized for well over a hundred years that not everything which is new is
capable of being patented. The newness, that is the difference over what was previously
known, must be sufficient in character, or in quantity, or in quality, in order that the new
thing may be patented." Id. §3. The Court in Graham also recognized that the standard
articulated in Hotchkiss was neCessary to determine whether an invention was novel. See
383 U.S. 1, 16, 86 S.Ct. 684, 693, 148 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 459, 466 (1966).
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courts to determine the patentability of claims containing
algorithms. Rather, the standard of patentability the courts
have traditionally required was that an invention merely
demonstrate utility and novelty with novelty further defined
by section 103. 101
~

PARADOXES CAUSED BY THE RESTRICTIVE
STANDARD

A.

MISINTERPRETING GOTTSCHALK V. BENSON

1.

Douglas' Cryptic Analysis

The author contends that the courts have consistently misinterpreted the holding of Gottschalk u. Benson and that
Justice Douglas carefully crafted his opinion in order to maintain the statutory scheme for patent protection articulated
in Graham while sustaining the efficiency of the patent office's
examining procedures. Benson did not hold that algorithms
were unpatentable per se. 102 In fact, the issue addressed by the
Benson court, whether algorithms were patentable processes,
was not the issue answered. 103 The gist of the Benson decision
101. See 383 U.S. 1, 18,86 S.Ct. 684, 693, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 466 (1966).
The exact language of the court is as follows:
The [1952] Act sets out the conditions of patentability in three
sections. An analysis of the structure of these three sections
indicates that patentability is dependent upon three explicit conditions: novelty and utility as articulated and defined
in §101 and § 102, and nonobviousness, the new statutory formulation, as set out in § 103. The Court continues to state
that "[wle believe that strict observance of the requirements
laid down here will result in that uniformity and definiteness
which Congress called for in the 1952 Act." (emphasis added).
Diamond v. Diehr 450 U.S. 175, 182, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 1054, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 6
(1982) ("Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act ... inform us that Congress·
intended statutory subject matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by
man." (quoting S.Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952))).
102. 409 U.S. at 71, 93 S. Ct. at 257, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 676 ("It is said that
the decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a computer. We do not so
hold.").
103. Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms
and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1057 n.102
(1990) ("Nevertheless it is a curious fact ... that the [Benson] Court did not directly answer
its own question"); see In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392, 1395, 178 U.S.P.Q. 35, 38
(C.C.P.A. 1973) (in a concurrign opinion, Justice Rich explained that the Court in
Benson never decided whether the algorithm at issue was patentable subject matter); compare In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237,1244,197 U.S.P.Q. 464, 470 (C. C.P.A. 1978) ("[T]hat
computer programs are not patentable was neither the holding nor the 'thrust' of
Benson.").
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was that the patent in that case was invalid because it did
not satisfy the disclosure requirements embodied in section
112.104
The caveat with the patent in Benson was the claims failure to enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the
claimed invention. lOG In his decision, Justice Douglas first
noted that the claims of the patent "weren't limited to any particular art or technology, to any particular apparatus or machinery, or to any particular end use."l06 Justice Douglas continued
to demonstrate the breadth of the claims by finding that they
could be carried out with or without any machinery.l07 He
found "the 'process' claim [was] so abstract and sweeping as to
cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure
binary conversion."lOS Finally, Justice Douglas held that the
claims were too broad to be patentable because they "would
wholly preempt the [algorithm]."l09
Modern patent law has recognized that the enablement
requirement of section 112 mandates that a patent specification teach those of ordinary skill in the art how to make and
use the invention without undue experimentation. 110 To further
refine the rule, the Federal Circuit considers several factors in
an undue experimentation analysis:
104. 35 U.S.C. §112. Under section 112, an patent specification must contain the
following: "a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process ofmaking and using it and the description must be "in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and these terms shall set forth
the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention (emphasis
added).
105. The issue of proper written description requirement of an invention arises
mostly where claims not present in an application when filed are present thereafter.
Bender, Disclosure Requirements for Software·Related Patents, 8 THE COMPUTER
LAWYER (P-H) No. 10 (Oct. 1991). An issue concerning best mode disclosure usually
arises after the patent has issued and is not generally considered by the Patent
Office during the prosecution of a patent. See id. Neither of these situations arose in
the Benson case.
106. 409 U.S. at 63, 93 S. Ct. at 253, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 674.
107. Id. at 67, S. Ct; at 255,175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 675 ("The mathematical procedures can be carried out in existing computers long in use, no new machinery
being necessary. And, as noted, they can also be performed [mentally] without a computer.
108. Id. 409 U.S. at 68, 93 S. Ct. at 255, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 675.
109. See id. at 72, S. Ct. at 257,175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 676.
110. See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736, 8 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d 1400, 1404
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
b

;

b

;

b

).
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(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary,
(2) the amount of direction or guidance presented,
(3) the presence or absence of working
examples,
(4) the nature of the invention,
(5) the state of the prior art,
(6) the relative skill of those in the art,
(7) the predictability or unpredictability of
the art, and
(8) the breadth of the claims.1l1

The Federal Circuit has determined that these factors are illustrative. 112 However, case precedent shows that overly broad claims
within a patent application have often caused a court to find a
patent invalid under section 112.113 From the foregoing discussion it becomes clear that Justice Douglas' analysis in
Benson corresponds more to an issue involving section 112 rather
than section 101. 114 Thus, reliance on Benson as holding that
algorithms are not patentable subject matter is dubious at best.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200,
1213, 18 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d 1016, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[I]t is not necessary that a
court review all the Wands factors to find a disc:losure enabling.").
113. See, e.g., Dolbear v. American Bell Tel., 126 U.S. 1, 154,8 S. Ct. 778, (1888)
(distinguishing this case from Morse, the Court here found the patent valid because
it was not for the use of a electricity in its natural state, but for using it in a specified
condition)j O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62,118·119 (1853) (where the Court
invalidated a process patent whereby the patentee sought to obtain the exc:lusive right
to the process of transmitting ·intelligible characters, signs, or letters at a distance
invalid because it was too broad and did not specify any specific machine that would
enable a person skilled in the art to make or use the machine)j Wyeth v. Stone, 30
F.Cas. 723,727 (1840 C.C.D. Mass.) (No. 18,107) (which c:learly articulates the rule
invalidating patents on claims so broad as to be abstract by finding invalid a patent
issued for an ice cutting machine because it was for an abstract principle since "the
patentee failed to describe the means used to cut the ice")j Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1214, 18 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d 1016, 1028
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (construing an appeal from a lower court's decision, the Federal
Circuit found "no error in the court's conclusion that the generic DNA sequence
claims are invalid under Section 112" because they were overly broad)jIn re Wands,
858 F.2d 731, 740, 8 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1400, 1407 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (in her dissent,
Justice Newman argued in favor of supporting the Patent Board's rejection of the patent
on the grounds that it was overly broad within the meaning of section 112).
114. This would coincide with Congress' findings that natural phenomenon
were not subject to patent protection because they were thought not to be amenable
to the written description requirement. See, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
312, 100 S. Ct. 2204, 2209, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 198 (1980) (An ·obstac:le to
patent protection for plants was the fact that they were thought not amenable to the
'written description' requirement of the patent law." (construing H.R. 11372, 71st Cong.,
2d Sess, 7 (1930))). Compare Bruzga, A Review of the Benson·Flook-Diehr
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Protecting The Graham Analysis

Justice Douglas addressed another issue in the Benson
decision: whether the PTO could effectively examine patent
applications containing claims for algorithms. The Court
quoted, at length, three paragraphs from the Report of the
President's Commission on the Patent System. 116 This report
prompted reservations concerning the PTO's ability to cope
administratively with computer related patent applications."lls
The Commission's findings were as follows:
The Patent Office now cannot examine applications for [computer related technology]
because of the lack of classification technique and the requisite search files. Even if
these were available, reliable searches would
not be feasible or economic because of the
tremendous volume of prior art being
generated. Without this search, the patenting of [computer related technology] would
be tantamount to mere registration and the
presumption of validity would be all but
nonexistent (emphasis added).1l7
Trilogy: Can the ·Subject Matter" Validity of Patent Claims Reciting Mathematical
Formulae Be Determined Under 35 U.S.C. Section 1121, 69 J. PAT. OFF. SOOty, 197
(1987) (in this article this author puts forth a theory that explains the Court's failure
to find mathematical formula patentable because often the claims reciting them are
too abstract); Cf. Meyer, Utility Requirement in the Statute, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Sooty, 533,
534 (1967) (explaining that the written description requirement of section 112 is essential in order for an invention to demonstrate utility).
115. The paragraphs quoted were:
"Uncertainty now exists as to whether the statute permits a
valid patent to be granted on programs. Indirect attempts
to obtain patents ... should not be permitted.
"The Patent Office now cannot examine applications for programs because of a lack of a classification technique ... the
patenting of programs would be tantamount to mere registration and the presumption of validity would be all but
nonexistent.
"It is noted ... that copyright protection for programs is
presently available.·
409 U.S. at 72, 93 S.Ct. at 257-258, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 677 (quoting To Promote
the Progress of ... Useful Arts, Report of the President's Commission on the Patent
System, 6 (1966».
116. See id.
117. To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF ... USEFUL ARTS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTS
COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, 6 at 13 (1966).
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The Court impliedly accepted the Commission's findings when
it deferred to legislative action for the resolution of whether
computer algorithms should be patentable. 118
The Commission's concern that patenting would become
mere registration is understandable considering the 1793 Act
was such a system and proved unworkable. 119 The Supreme
Court's resistance to patenting an invention for which no prior
art could be examined is understandable considering the Court
had just concluded 116 years of labor in articulating a workable
test for determining patentable subject matter that focused
upon analyzing prior art.120 Preserving the statutory scheme
articulated in the Graham decision was a major consideration
in the reasoning of the Benson decision. However, the problems
raised by the Commission are no longer present today.
The Patent Trademark Office recently completed an automated patent search system as a part of an automation effort
begun in 1980. 121 They have taken steps to facilitate searching
for prior art by reclassifying subclasses of computer-related
technology so that people with computer related backgrounds
can explore prior art more proficiently.122 Because the problems
that were present when the Court rendered its Benson decision
are no longer present, the Court should limit Benson to the facts
of that case.

B.

THE INFRINGEMENT DILEMMA.

The present failure of the Court to recognize proprietary
rights in algorithms has caused lower courts to undermine
many existing patents. This has become increasingly apparent in actions for infringement. Determining infringemenhs
a two-step process: the court must ascertain the scope of the
claim reciting the infringed device and determine if that claim
encompasses the alleged infringing device, then it must determine if either literal infringement or infringement under the
118. See 409 U.S. at 73, 93 S.Ct. at 258, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 676-677 ("It may
be that the patent laws should be extended to cover these [algorithms], a policy matter to which we are not competent to speak ... action by the Congress is needed. ").
119. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 84-101 and accompanying text.
121. 137 CONGo REC. S 3,939, S23,940 (1991) (Senator Roth introducting the
Patent Information Dissemination Act of 1991).
122. Bender, Current Developments In Software Patents, 298 P.L.!. PAT 379, 397
(1990).
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doctrine of equivalents is present. 123 "Literal infringement requires
that the accused device embody every element of the claim."I24 If
the accused device does not infringe literally, it may still infringe
under the Doctrine of Equivalents if it "work[s] in substantially the same way, and accomplish[es] substantially the same
result ... even though they differ in name, form, or shape. "126
Computer technology added a twist to patent protection
because of the technology's logical equivalency. Gemignani provides the clearest example:
If a mechanical device were built to invert
matrices, it would be patentable subject matter as a machine ... [C]all it MIM (matrix
inverting machine). If a program were written to invert matrices using the same algorithm employed in the design of the MIM, the
program would convert a computer which it
was running into a virtual MIM.I26

The result is that any inventor could subvert the mechanical MIM
by simply writing a program containing the same algorithm. 127
Recently, a Federal District Court addressed an infringement issue similar to Gemignani's example in Allen-Bradley Co.
v. Autotech Corp .. 128 Autotech sued Allen-Bradley for infringement of its process control computer.129 This case found that for
the purposes of infringement, a program stored in a Read
Only Memory (ROM), is different from that stored in a Random
Access Memory (RAM).130 The court found no literal infringe123. Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Products Co. 793 F.2d
1279, 1282, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 46 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
124. Builders Concrete, Inc., v. Bremerton Concrete Products Co., 757 F.2d
255,257,225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 240, 241 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
125. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 70 S.Ct.
854,94 L.Ed. 1097,85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 328 (1950).
126. See M. GEMIGNANI, COMPUTER LAw § 42:31 (1985).
127. See id.
128. No. 86-C8514, 1989 WL 39795 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 1989).
129. "A programmable controller is a type of computer system designed particularly for use in a factory environment to direct the function of other machines. For
example, a programmable controller can be used to control presses, drills, lathes and
direct the functions of robots in the manufacturing process.ld. at .1.
130. See id. at ·2. The court described the difference between the two types of
memories as follows:
The distinction between [ROM] and [RAM] The tasks
performed by the programmable controllers are, of course,
programmed into the machines. This program of instruction
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ment because the accused device did not contain every element
of the protected device, i.e., one device contained a RAM and the
other contained a ROM.131 Furthermore, the court found no
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents because one
could not modify the program in the ROM of the patented device
whereas the program in the RAM of the accused device was easily modified. 132 In spite of the fact that both programs, in their
respective memories, may be logically equivalent, the court
failed to protect Autotech's device from infringement. As one
commentator explained "[t]his case is either an object lesson in
how to write a claim involving software-do not restrict a program
to being executed in a ROM-or it is a failure by a court to understand" the logical equivalency of computer-technology. 133 This
decision is a quintessential example of the problems facing
patent law until proprietary rights in algorithms are reorganized.

C.

UNPREDICTABILITY IN THE PATENT TRADEMARK OFFICE

The present practices of the PTO are not consistent with its
policies. The patent office asserts that they do not patent
"mere computer programs or mathematical formulas. "134
However, a survey taken from July 1, 1987 to December 31,
1987 discovered that the Patent Trademark Office had issued
1.65 software patents per week. 13G Often these claims were
(designated by Allen-Bradley as the ·user control program")
is stored in the memory of the programmable controller. in
which this program can be stored, but for purposes of this
motion only two are material. The [ROM] used in the Autotech
patent is generally programmed a single time. When the
instruction program is located in [ROM] the programmable
controller ... can only read the instructions from the memory; the user cannot easily write new instructions into the memory . . . . The key feature of read-only memory is its
non-volatility: in the event of a power outage, the instruction
program is not lost. The [RAM] contained in the Allen-Bradley
invention, by contrast, allows the instruction program to be
altered, edited or rewritten an unlimited amount of times at
the discretion of the user. . .. The chief disadvantage of
[RAM] is its volatility; i.e., the information that is stored in
a [RAM] can be lost in the event of a power outage.
131. The court stated, ·[b]ecause of the fundamental difference in the type ofmemory in which the instruction is stored and from which the instruction program is executed between [the accused patent and the protected one], there is no literal
infringement." 1d. at -4.
132. 1d. at -5.
133. See M. GEMIGNANI, COMPUTER LAw § 42:28 n.17.1 (Supp. 1991).
134. Goldberg, Patent Protection for Computer Processes and Computer Devices,
C567 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 139 (1990). (speaking on behalf of the Patent Trademark Office).
135. Syrowik, Patent Protection for Software Technology-A Powerful New Form
of Protection, 67 MICH. B.J. 968, 968 (1988).
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broad enough not only to cover the program code, but also to
include the underlying algorithm. 138 Further, the PTO has
issued five patents for algorithms since 1987. 137 One of the
patents, the Karmarkar algorithm, is similar to one which the
C.C.P.A. previously held unpatentable. 13s Often, when the
patent office had issued a patent for an algorithm, it was given
under the deceptive description of a Computer and a Method. 139
However, in light of recent decisions concerning infringement,
the protection expected for these patents is minimal at best.
The author believes that the combined effect of the infringement actions and the practices of the PTO will seriously undermine the integrity of the patent system. Although one is given
exclusive rights in a patent,140 registering an invention with the
PTO ensures that sufficient information will be available so
that those who wish to develop the algorithm can do SO.141
However, the courts have clearly shown that they will not
recognize a proprietary right in an algorithm. 142 It will not be
long before inventors realize that there exists little incentive
to bring forth, to the PTO, useful inventions when the court will
fail to uphold the patents.
VI. A SUPERIOR STANDARD OF PATENTABILITY:
HUMAN INGENUITY
A.

LAWS OF NATURE AND NATURAL PHENOMENON

The problems arising from the current policy toward patenting algorithms demonstrate a need for fundamental change in
136. Id ..
137. Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection For
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1100
(1990) (citing N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1989, at D1, col. 4.). The patents are the 1989
Duhamel patent for a method of performing discrete cosine transformation (4,797,847)
the 1989 Eastman Kodak patent for a system incorporating an error tolerant compression algorithm (No. 4,797,729), the 1988 Karmarkar algorithm (No. 4,744,028),
the 1988 TRW patent for squared radix discrete Fourier transform algorithm (No.
4,768,159), and the 1987 Bracewell fast fourier transform (No. 4,646,256). Id. at n.282.
138. [d ..
139. See 1075 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFFICE 2236 (1987) (Pat. No. 4,646,256, issued Feb.
24, 1987). This was the Bracewell Fourier Transform. This is a sophisticated signal
processing algorithm that enables computer to process certain calculations at twice
the speed regardless of the hardware.
140. See supra note 22.
141. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ("A [patent] specification shall contain a written description
of the invention ... in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to ... carry out [the] invention").
142. See generally supra notes 26-64 and accompanying text.
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the Court's standard of patentability. The Court should abolish its per se rule against patenting certain inventions, as it did
with biotechnology patents. Instead, it should focus on whether
there has been human intervention in the development of the
algorithm to determine its patentability.
The traditional rule that living organisms were not the
proper subject for patent protection derives from late Nineteenth
Century patent law. '48 This rule was probably a misinterpretation of the rule de;rived from LeRoy v. Tatham,'44 that "[p]henomena of nature are not the proper subject for patent protection. "145
In Tatham the patent at issue claimed novelty not in the mechanical parts, which were previously known, but in the process of
manufacturing lead pipes with a combination of heat and pressure. l46 The Tatham court stated, "a principle, in the abstract,
is a fundamental truth ... and cannot be patented .... ,"147 but
the Court qualified that rule by stating that a law of nature may
be the proper subject of a patent if applied to a new and useful
result.l46 ~ubsequent decisions attempted to develop a standard
to determine when a phenomena of nature was the proper subject of a patent. 149 However, the Court never clearly defined a
standard, and the rule against patenting phenomena of nature
was applied indiscriminately.
143. See, Thorne, Relation of Patent Law to Natural Products, 6 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y
23,24 (1923) ("[P]lants ... even though very valuable uses may be discovered for them,
or that they may have been obtained by the aid of scientific management in their propagation ... are not discoveries which are subject to patentable protection." (construing Ex parte Latimer, 1889 DEC. COMM'R PAT. 123».
144. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1853).
145. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 1056, 209
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 89 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589, 98 S. Ct. 2522, 2525,
198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 197 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 93 S. Ct. 253,
255, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673, 675 (1972). All three of these cases cite Tatham as holding that phenomena of nature are not the proper subject for patent protection.
146. Leroy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174 (1853).
147. 1d. at 175. The Court explained that a process, embodying a law of nature,
"must be stated with such precision as to enable an ordinary mechanic to construct and
apply the necessary process." Thus, the principle would no longer be in the abstract.
148. 1d. ("A patent will be good though the subject of the patent consists ... of a
... law of nature if that principle is ... applied to ... a practical result and benefit not
previously attained." (quoting the English case of Househill v. Nielson, Webster's
Patent Cases 683». It is apparent from the Court interchanging the use of the phrase
"phenomena of nature" with the phrase "law of nature" and vice versa, that a law of
nature is a subset of the greater category of pohenomena of nature, i.e., a law of nature
is a phenomena of nature, but a phenomena of nature is not necessarily a law of nature.
149. In patents containing claims for apparatuses, the Court has found that "a
scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention,
but a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth
may be." See Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86,
94,59 S. Ct. 427, 431 (1939) (this case sustained the validity ofa patent that granted
the patent holder the exclusive right to manufacture antennas designed to the
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This rule reached its zenith in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co .. 160. Here, the Court reviewed a district
court's invalidation of a patent for various bacteria of the
genus Rhizobium. 161 Although the Court found the product
highly useful,162 Justice Douglas held that the invention was
not patentable because the inventor created a compound that
merely embodied the natural qualities of the bacteria. 163

B.

THE HUMAN INGENUITY TEST

More recently, the Court has developed a test to determine whether an invention that embodies natural qualities may
be the subject of a patent. 164 For example, in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty/56 a divided Court upheld a patent for a living
microorganism into which the inventor had introduced multiple
naturally occurring bacterial plasmids. l66 The Court rejected
the PTO's argument that living organisms are not patentable
and held that a living, genetically altered, organism may' qualify for patent protection as a new "manufacture" or "composition of matter" under section 101 of the Patent Act.167
Recognizing that the categories of patentable subject matter
specifications of a mathematical formula); see also, Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co.,
333 U.S. 127, 130, 68 S. Ct. 440, 441 (explaining that one may obtain a patent on a natural phenomenon only ifit one applies it to a new and useful end).
In patent applications containing process claims, the Court has found that phenomena of nature, used in a specified manner, will be the proper subject of a patent.
See Dolbear v. American Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1,533,8 S.Ct. 778, 781 (1888) ("In the
present case the claim is not for the use of a current of electricity in its natural state
as it comes from the battery, but for putting a continuous current, in a closed circuit,
into a certain specified condition, suited to the transmission of vocal and other
sounds, and using it in that condition for that purpose." (emphasis added».
·150. 333 U.S. 127,68 S. Ct. 440 (1948).
151. Id. at 128-129, 68 S. Ct. at 440. These bacteria, when fixed to the roots of
certain leguminous plants, enabled those plants to fix nitrogen from the air.
152. [d. at 131, 68 S. Ct. at 442. The Caveat was that out of the six Rhizobium
species, no one species would be effective on the roots of all species of leguminous
plants. The patentee discovered a certain mixture of these bacteria that would work
on all leguminous plants without side adverse side-effects.
153. Id. ("The combination of species produces no new bacteria, no change in
the six species of bacteria, and no enlargement of the range of their utility ... The
bacteria perform in their natural way ... They serve the ends nature originally provided and act quite independently of any effort of the patentee)."
154. See, Eisenberg, Patenting the Human Genome, 39 EMORY L.J. 721 (1990)
([Recent] "case law does not deny patent protection to all inventions composed of naturally occurring products or manifesting laws of nature. Instead, the cases suggest
that the patentability of such inventions turns on whether the claimed invention is
a new product or process resulting from human intervention ....").
155. 447 U.S. 303,100 S. Ct. 2204, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1980).
156. For an analysis of this invention, see infra notes 163-168 and accompanying text.
157. [d. at 311,100 S. Ct. at 2208-2209, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 198 (1980).
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listed in section 101 were not exhaustive/58 the Court adopted a broad construction of the statute. In support of this
broad construction, the Court quoted language from the
Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Patent Act to show
that Congress intended statutory subject matter to "include
anything under the sun that is made by man."159 As a result of
Chakrabarty, the PTO uses human ingenuity as the touchstone
for determining the patentability of claims reciting biotechnological inventions. l60
In Chakrabarty, Chief Justice Burger recognized two factors as determinative when finding human ingenuity present
in an invention: the inventions utility, and its character.161 It
is unlikely that the Court considered the utility of the invention as a controlling factor for finding human ingenuity because
the Court had previously held that the most useful of natural
elements are not the proper subject of a patent. lS2 Undoubtedly,
the principal inquiry here was the character of the invention.
Examining Chakrabarty's invention, one finds that it consisted of a bacteria capable of degrading four main components of crude oil. ls3 While there were no known naturally
occurring bacteria that could perform this task, there were four
158. Id. at 316, 100 S. Ct. at 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at (MCongress employed broad
general language in drafting section 101 precisely because ... inventions are often
unforseeable. ").
159. ld. at 308,100 S. Ct. at 2208-2209, 206 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) at 197 (1980) (The
Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act inform us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to -include anything under the sun that is made by man."
S.Rep.No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R.Rep.No.1923. 82d Cong., 2d Sess.,
6 (1952) (footnote omitted).
160. See, Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d 1425, 1426 (1987) (MThe issue, in
our view, in determining whether the claimed subject matter is patentable under
Section 101 is simply whether that subject matter is made by man"); Ex parte Hibberd,
227 U.S.P.Q. 443 (1985) (the Board of Patent Appeals held that non-naturally occurring, multicellular living plants were patentable subject matter under § 101).
161. Burger stated:
Here, by contrast, the patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any
found in nature and one having the potential for significant utility. His discovery is not nature' handiwork, but his
own ....
447 U.S. at 310,100 S. Ct. at 2208, 206 U.S.P.Q. (RNA) at 197.
162. See, Thome, Relation of Patent Law to Natural Products, 6 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y
23,24; Ex parte Latimer, 1889 DEC. COMM'R. PAT. 123, 127.
.
163. 1981 Chakrabarty Patent for Microorganisms Having Multiple Compatible
Degradative Energy-Generating Plasmids (No.4,259,444); see also Application of
Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 968, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352, 197 (C.C.P.A. 1979), affd, 447 U.S.
303 (1981) (the purpose of this new bacteria was destroy maritime oil slicks by dissolving components of the oil into substances that would serve as food for fish).
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bacteria that could break-down anyone of the components of
the crude oil. l64 From these four bacteria, Chakrabarty isolated
the plasmid that enabled the bacteria to degrade the crude oil. 165
These plasmids consist of double-stranded DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) molecules: products of nature that are
organized in a definitive complex structure. 166 Chakrabarty's
invention consisted of organizing the genetic sequence of the
plasmids so as to make them compatible with both each other,
and the bacteria that would act as the host cell for the
plasmids. 167 Although the invention consisted of a combination
of naturally occurring elements, the Court recognized this
combination of naturally occurring elements to form a useful
invention for society as a product of ingenuity.16B
C.

ALGORITHMS: A PRODUCT OF HUMAN INGENUITY

Given the Court's willingness to interpret section 101
broadly for biotechnology patents, the Court should extend this
164. Chakrabarty described the disadvantages of using the existing bacteria as
foliows:
However, since bacterial strains differ from one another in
a) their rates of growth on the various hydrocarbon components, b) nutritional requirements, production of antibiotics
or other toxic material, and c) requisite pH, temperature and
mineral salts, the use of a mixed culture leads to the ultimate
survival of but a portion of the initial collection of bacterial
strains. As a result, when a mixed culture of hydrocarbondegrading bacteria are deposited on a oil spill the bulk of the
oil often remains unattached for a long period of time (weeks)
and is free to spread or sink.
1981 Chakrabarty Patent for Microorganisms Having Multiple Compatible Degradative
Energy-Generating Plasmids (No.4,259,444); see also Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d
952,968,201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352, 197 (C.C.P.A. 1979), affd, 447 U.S. 303 (1981).
165. 1981 Chakrabarty Patent for Microorganisms Having Multiple Compatible
Degradative Energy-Generating Plasmids (No.4,259,444); see also Application of
Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 968, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352, 197 (C.C.P.A. 1979), affd, 447 U.S.
303 (1981).
166. "The structure [of DNA] suggests ... there is some sort of genetic code
whereby information in DNA is written as a sequence of nucleotide pairs and translated
into a different language of amino acid sequences in protein." D. SUZUKI, A. GRIFFITHS,
J. MILLER & R. LEWONTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO GENETICS ANALYSIS 192 (3rd ed. 1986).
167. See 1981 Chakrabarty Patent for Microorganisms Having Multiple
Compatible Degradative Energy-Generating Plasmids (No.4,259,444); see also
Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 968, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352, 197 (C.C.P.A.
1979), affd, 447 U.S. 303 (1981) (if the genetic sequence of the plasmids were not compatible, the probability that the bacteria would survive was minimal).
168. See 447 U.S. 303,310,100 S. Ct. 2204, 2208, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 197
(1981) ("[T]he patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature .... His discovery was not nature's handiwork,
but his own .... ").
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reasoning to patent claims containing algorithms because they
are also the product of human ingenuity. One can think of an
algorithm as a combination of fundamental laws, i.e., addition,
subtraction, multiplication, or as an expression of a fundamental law of nature, e.g., E=m~. However, once placed in a program, an algorithm must be expressed in structured sequence
of operations. 1s9 If this sequence is not properly constructed, the
program will have no utility. Organizing an algorithm's sequence
within a computer program requires human ingenuity, i.e. programming. Deriving utility from human ingenuity should be the
touchstone for finding algorithms amenable to patent protection.
This approach has long been the standard espoused by the
Supreme Court for determining whether a law of nature is the
proper subject of a patent. 170
169. See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text. Many scholars and practitioners alike argue that both algorithms and programs should be afforded only copyright protection because they are merely expressions ofideas. However, this is not the
case. Utility should be the distinguishing characteristic for differentiating between
a product that is copyrightable from one that is patentable. This Court could solve this
apparent problem ifit would merely define the requisite utility required for an invention to be amenable to patent protection.
For example, one could easily argue that a new nonobvious story expressed in a
book is a patentable invention. Stories have a definite structure, e.g., a plot or a storyline. An author expresses sentences in a definitive structure to convey the story.
Obviously, the contents of the story are far different than anything that exists in
nature. However, it is commonly understood that a book is merely an expression of
ideas and not a useful article. This is an overly simplistic view standard. Any reader who enjoys a book obviously finds it useful for enjoyment. Yet, it is not the type of
utility that affords stories patent protection.
Examining algorithms, one easily finds that those algorithms recited in a word
processing program are inherently useful when applied to a computer. This makes writing papers easier. Not all word processing programs are alike, e.g., some are both easier and have more ,functions, to use than others making thein more useful. The
distinguishing characteristics between these programs is often the algorithms recited in them. Yet, as books, these algorithms are also expressions of ideas, and as such
they are not patentable regardless of their utility. However, if these algorithms were
tangible, there would be no question that they would be patentable.
Perhaps physicality is not the proper touchstone for distinguishing between that
which is copyrightable from that which is patentable. Rather, it should be utility. The
author suggests that in the future, the Supreme Court should focus on the requisite utility an invention must demonstrate in order to be amenable to patent protection.
170. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 1057,209
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) I, 8 (1981) ("an application of a law of nature or a mathematical
formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection");
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co. 333 U.S. 127, 130,68 S. Ct. 440, 441 (1948) ("[i]fthere
is to be invention for [a] discovery [of nature], it must come from the application of the
law of nature to a new and useful end"); Mackay Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94, 59
S. Ct. 427, 431 (1939) ("[w]hile a scientific truth, or a mathematical expression ofit, is
not 'a patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of
knowledge of scientific truth may be"); Leroy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853)
("A patent will be good though the subject of the patent consists ... ofa ... law of nature
if that principle is ... applied to ... a practical result and benefit not previously
attained." (quoting the English case of Househill v. Nielson, Webster's Patent Cases 683».
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Furthermore, Chakrabarty's focus on human ingenuity for
determining whether an invention is the proper subject of a
patent is wholly consistent with the statutory scheme for
patent protection espoused in Graham. The Graham court
interpreted the new condition of patentable novelty contained
in the 1952 Act as embodying the standard set forth in
Hotchkiss.l7l This standard focused on human ingenuity.172
Thus, both Graham and Chakrabarty support the same principle that the proper inquiry is on the extent of human ingenuity involved in the inventive process when determining
patentable subject matter.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Court's restrictive standard of patentability has caused
considerable problems in the patent system concerning claims
containing algorithms. Because the Diehr Court was wrong in
interpreting the categories of patentable subject matter in
section 101 as a separate and distinct requirement apart from
the test of invention articulated in section 102-103, the Court
should abolish its current approach of categorically precluding
certain inventions from patent protection. This approach
must give way, as it did in biotechnology patent law, to a more
predictable standard of patentability: a focus on human ingenuity. This standard of review is more amenable to case precedent and a less arbitrary standard of patentability than that
currently used in computer technology patent law. Finally, this
standard would assist the United States patent system in
affording patent protection to those inventions most amenable
to it: unforseen technologies.

Kenneth C. Brooks *

171. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
172. See Burchfiel, Rellising the ·Original· Patent Clause, 2 HARv. J.L. & TECH.,
155, 167 (1989) Burchfiel explains that the essential inquiry to determine patentable
novelty is whether the skill required to make the changes in an invention exceed the
ordinary skill in the art. This skill required in nothing less than human intervention.
* Golden Gate University School of Law Class of 1993. The author extends his
gratification to Dominic Falasco for the performance of his duties as editor.
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